Lee P Butler

ABLE DANGER FILE

Lee's Columns
The Global Warming Myth
Calvin's Snowmen
Liberal media and Democrat Lies
North Carolina Politics
Resource Information for Issues
Columns Everyone Should Read
More News & Links
Iraq: A Moment of Transcendentalism In History
Washington Times Insider Links
They Greeted Us As Liberators
Ronald Reagan Tribute Page
The Bush Years
Book Page
About Me
Contact Me
Calvin's Snowmen

Documents detailing the work of a top secret military intelligence unit that identified lead 9/11 hijacker Mohamed Atta before the 9/11 attacks have disappeared, according to the Defense Intelligence Agency's liaison for the group, code named Able Danger.

 
Media Lockdown... 911 Commission Cover-up... Clinton Administration Tsunami of a Failure: ABLE DANGER
 
Statement from Republican Senator who is exposing this national security debacle of the Clinton administration, Rep. Curt Weldon: Mr. Speaker, I rise because information has come to my attention over the past several months that is very disturbing. I have learned that, in fact, one of our Federal agencies had, in fact, identified the major New York cell of Mohamed Atta prior to 9/11; and I have learned, Mr. Speaker, that in September of 2000, that Federal agency actually was prepared to bring the FBI in and prepared to work with the FBI to take down the cell that Mohamed Atta was involved in in New York City, along with two of the other terrorists.

I have also learned, Mr. Speaker, that when that recommendation was discussed within that Federal agency, the lawyers in the administration at that time (the Clinton administration) said, you cannot pursue contact with the FBI against that cell. Mohamed Atta is in the U.S. on a green card, and we are fearful of the fallout from the Waco incident. So we did not allow that Federal agency to proceed.

Mr. Speaker, what this now means is that prior to September 11, we had employees of the Federal Government in one of our agencies who actually identified the Mohamed Atta cell and made a specific recommendation to act on that cell, but were denied the ability to go forward. Obviously, if we had taken out that cell, 9/11 would not have occurred and, certainly, taking out those three principal players in that cell would have severely crippled, if not totally stopped, the operation that killed 3,000 people in America.
 
What's worse is the 9-11 Commission (one of it's members, Jamie Gorelick, was the person who created the wall now held responsible for preventing the FBI and CIA to communicate information) completely disregarded ABLE DANGER:

WASHINGTON, Aug. 10 - The Sept. 11 commission was warned by a uniformed military officer 10 days before issuing its final report that the account would be incomplete without reference to what he described as a secret military operation that by the summer of 2000 had identified as a potential threat the member of Al Qaeda who would lead the attacks more than a year later, commission officials said on Wednesday.

The officials said that the information had not been included in the report because aspects of the officer's account had sounded inconsistent with what the commission knew about that Qaeda member, Mohammed Atta, the plot's leader.

But aides to the Republican congressman who has sought to call attention to the military unit that conducted the secret operation said such a conclusion relied too much on specific dates involving Mr. Atta's travels and not nearly enough on the operation's broader determination that he was a threat.

The briefing by the military officer is the second known instance in which people on the commission's staff were told by members of the military team about the secret program, called Able Danger.

Then Rep.WELDON REJECTS 9/11 COMMISSION CLAIM THEY NEVER HEARD OF "ABLE DANGER"  : In the letter, Congressman Weldon calls on the 9/11 Public Discourse Project to answer two fundamental questions:

#1) What lawyers in the Department of Defense made the decision in late 2000 not to pass the information from Able Danger to the FBI?

#2) Why did the 9-11 Commission staff not find it necessary to pass this information to the Commissioners, and why did the 9-11 Commission staff not request full documentation of Able Danger from the team member that volunteered the information?

More information has come to light: Atta Report Hints Solons May Have Acted Too Quickly :  WASHINGTON - The recent disclosure that a Pentagon unit experimenting with data-mining technologies apparently linked the ringleader of the September 11, 2001, attacks to a Brooklyn-based terror cell more than a year before the strikes is prompting new questions about whether the Pentagon and Congress acted too hastily when they publicly disavowed such database intensive research in 2003.

Mr. Weldon, 58, has been preoccupied with the issue for years. In that time, his blunt and persistent approach has managed to irritate, if not anger, much of the intelligence establishment. Now, however, the 10-term congressman has stumbled onto what may be the most powerful piece of anecdotal evidence ever produced in favor of the technology, which involves using high-powered computers to sift through enormous quantities of data from a host of public and private sources.

The startling suggestion that a Defense Department unit was on the trail of Mohammed Atta and other terrorists more than a year before they struck was aired by Mr. Weldon for the first time on the House floor on June 27, 2005. The congressman delivered the so-called special order speech just before midnight, during a period reserved for lengthy remarks that are almost always ignored by the press.

The plot thickens... the 9-11 Commission may have committed a cover-up: COMMISSION COVERUP? : IT'S starting to look as if the 9/11 Commission turned a blind eye to key questions that could embarrass one of its own members — Clinton-era Justice Department honcho Jamie Gorelick.

This week brought the stunning revelation that elite military spies pinpointed Mohammed Atta and three other hijackers as a terror cell more than a year before 9/11 — but were barred from alerting lawmen to try to lock them up.

A prime reason why that warning never came is that Gorelick — as top deputy to then-Attorney General Janet Reno — issued a 1995 order creating a "wall" that blocked intelligence on terrorists from being shared with law enforcement.

It gets worse. Gorelick's defenders might argue that hindsight is 20-20. But that excuse doesn't work in this case, because she was warned way back then — when the see-no-evil wall was created.

That warning came right from the front line in the War on Terror — from Manhattan U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White, who headed up key terror probes like the prosecutions for the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993.

White — herself a Clinton appointee — wrote directly to Reno that the wall was a big mistake.

"The most effective way to combat terrorism is with as few labels and walls as possible so that wherever permissible, the right and left hands are communicating."

That memo surfaced during the 9/11 hearings. But The Post has learned that White was so upset that she bitterly protested with another memo — a scathing one — after Reno and Gorelick refused to tear down the wall.

The 9/11 Commission got that White memo, The Post was told — but omitted any mention of it from its much-publicized report. Nor does the report include the transcript of its staff interview with White.

The CIA may have failed to detect the hijackers, but it appears that military intelligence did better. Maybe the real problem wasn't an intelligence failure — as the 9/11 Commission concluded — but, rather, the Reno-Gorelick wall.

The latest revelations show that skeptics like Sens. Jon Cornyn (R-Tex.) and Christopher Bond (R-Mo.) were right to demand that Gorelick testify publicly about the wall — a demand that the 9/11 Commission flatly rejected last year.

Rep. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) — who revealed how the Able Danger military spies tried to sound the alarm — yesterday accused the commission of ignoring inconvenient facts.

"The commission's refusal to investigate Able Danger after being notified of its existence, and its recent efforts to feign ignorance of the project while blaming others for supposedly withholding information on it, brings shame on the commissioners," he wrote.

Or, as a frustrated Cornyn said in 2004: "[Gorelick] is a person with knowledge of relevant facts. Either the commission wants the whole truth or it does not."

It's about time that the 9/11 Commission faced that question.

Even more troubling... Attorney General John Ashcroft exposed Commissioner Jamie Gorelick's role in undermining the nation's security capabilities  by issuing a directive insisting that the FBI and federal prosecutors ignore information gathered through intelligence investigations.

But Ashcroft pointed to another document that also has potentially explosive revelations about the Clinton administration's security failures. Ashcroft stated, in part: [T]he Commission should study carefully the National Security Council plan to disrupt the al Qaeda network in the U.S. that our government failed to implement fully seventeen months before September 11.

The NSC's Millennium After Action Review declares that the United States barely missed major terrorist attacks in 1999 — with luck playing a major role. Among the many vulnerabilities in homeland defenses identified, the Justice Department's surveillance and FISA operations were specifically criticized for their glaring weaknesses. It is clear from the review that actions taken in the Millennium Period should not be the operating model for the U.S. government.

In March 2000, the review warns the prior Administration of a substantial al Qaeda network and affiliated foreign terrorist presence within the U.S., capable of supporting additional terrorist attacks here.

Furthermore, fully seventeen months before the September 11 attacks, the review recommends disrupting the al Qaeda network and terrorist presence here using immigration violations, minor criminal infractions, and tougher visa and border controls.

Despite the warnings and the clear vulnerabilities identified by the NSC in 2000, no new disruption strategy to attack the al Qaeda network within the United States was deployed. It was ignored in the Department's five-year counterterrorism strategy.

For one reason or another... 9/11 Report Missed Key Facts; 'Huge Deal,' Lawmaker Says:  Because the Clinton administration barred U.S. intelligence agencies from sharing information with the FBI, Pentagon lawyers reportedly argued that information on the legal residents could not be shared with the FBI.

Thursday's New York Times reported that 9/11 commission staffers were told that Able Danger had identified a terror cell in the country - a full ten days before the 9/11 commission issued its final report on the terror attacks.

Sen. Curt Weldon (R-Pa.) told Fox News on Wednesday that commission staffers were briefed at least once on Able Danger, but he does not believe that panel members were told about it.

"Why weren't they briefed? Was there some deliberate attempt at the staff level of the 9/11 commission to steer the commissioners away from Able Danger because of where it might lead?" Weldon said on Fox News Wednesday.

Copyright 2016 Lee P Butler. All Rights Reserved.